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Summary 
Based on survey data from 193 banks in 20 countries we provide the first bank-level analysis of the 
relationship between bank ownership, bank-funding and foreign currency (FX) lending across 
Emerging Europe. Our results contradict the widespread view that foreign banks have been driving 
FX lending to retail clients as a result of easier access to foreign wholesale funding. Our cross-
sectional analysis shows that foreign banks do lend more in FX to corporate clients but not to 
households. Moreover, we find no evidence that wholesale funding had a strong causal effect on FX 
lending for either foreign or domestic banks. Panel estimations show that the foreign acquisition of 
a domestic bank does lead to faster growth in FX lending to households. However, this is driven by 
faster growth in household lending in general not by a shift towards FX lending.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Unhedged foreign currency (FX) borrowing is seen as a major threat to financial stability in 
Emerging Europe. More than 80 percent of all private sector loans in Belarus, Latvia and Serbia are 
currently denominated in (or linked to) a foreign currency and the share of FX loans also exceeds 
that of domestic currency loans in various other countries including Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Romania (EBRD, 2010). FX borrowing throughout the region is dominated by retail loans – 
household mortgages, consumer credit, and small business loans – to clients which typically have 
their income and assets in local currency. It is therefore not surprising that national authorities have 
taken measures to discourage such loans. Supervisors in Hungary, Latvia and Poland have pushed 
banks to disclose the exchange rate risks of FX loans to clients and to tighten the eligibility criteria 
for such loans. In countries like Croatia, Kazakhstan and Romania stronger provisioning 
requirements were imposed on FX compared to local currency loans. Ukraine even completely 
banned FX lending to households in late 2008. 
The call for policies to curb FX lending in Eastern Europe has intensified lately. In June 2010 the 
ECB stated that national efforts to rein in FX lending have had little impact and called for better 
coordination, including among home-country regulators of banks with subsidiaries in Eastern 
Europe.1 In this line of thinking FX lending is largely supply-driven, with FX funding of banks, 
often from their parent banks, at the heart of the problem. Surprisingly, the widespread view that 
FX lending in Eastern Europe is driven by foreign bank subsidiaries with access to ample FX 
funding has not yet been substantiated by empirical analysis. Comparisons of cross-country data 
document higher shares of FX lending in countries where banks have larger cross-border liabilities 
(Bakker and Gulde, 2010; Basso et al., 2010). However, whether such liabilities are causing or 
being caused by FX loans is hard to establish from aggregate data. Recent loan-level evidence for 
Bulgaria suggests that FX lending seems to be at least partly driven by customer deposits in FX, 
while wholesale funding in FX is a result rather than a cause of FX lending (Brown et al., 2010). It 
is unclear, however, whether this applies to a broad set of banks across the transition region. 
The impact of foreign bank ownership on euroisation and financial stability is a pertinent policy 
question. After the fall of the Berlin wall governments and development institutions actively 
supported the process of banking integration between Western and Eastern Europe. This support 
was based on the presumed positive impact of foreign bank entry on the efficiency and stability of 
local banking systems. The empirical evidence that emerged over the next two decades suggests 
that foreign banks indeed contributed to more efficient (Fries and Taci, 2005) and stable (De Haas 
and Van Lelyveld, 2006) banking sectors. However, the recent financial crisis has hit Emerging 
Europe hard and questions have been raised about foreign banks’ role in creating the economic 
imbalances, including large unhedged FX exposures, which made the region vulnerable. Regulation 
may help to counterbalance distortions – such as banks and borrowers that disregard the negative 
externalities of FX loans in terms of increasing the risk of a systemic crisis (see Rancière et al., 
2010). Our paper contributes to this debate by using bank-level data to analyse to what extent FX 
lending in Eastern Europe is related to the presence of foreign banks and their funding. 
Our main data source is the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) 
conducted in 2005 and covering 95 foreign-owned and 98 domestic-owned banks in 20 transition 
countries. The BEPS elicits detailed information on the loan and deposit structure of each bank in 
2001 and 2004, its risk management, as well as its assessment of local creditor rights and banking 
                                                 
1 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201006en.pdf. 
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regulation. We match the BEPS data with financial statement data provided by Bureau van Dijk’s 
BankScope database and with country-level indicators of the interest rate differential on foreign 
versus local currency funds, exchange rate volatility, inflation history, and the position of the 
country on the path towards EU accession. 
While we do not cover the immediate run-up to and aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the 
observation period covered by our data is particularly interesting to study FX lending dynamics. 
During this period foreign currency lending to corporate clients was already widespread in Eastern 
Europe. For the banks in our sample the mean share of the corporate loan portfolio denominated in 
FX was 41 percent in 2001 and 44 percent in 2004. During this three-year period we do, however, 
observe a significant increase in FX lending by banks in some countries (such as Belarus and 
Estonia) while in other countries (Kazakhstan, Russia) banks reduced FX lending. Furthermore, FX 
lending to households increased substantially across Eastern Europe during our observation period. 
Considering the banks in our sample, we find that the share of FX loans in their household loan 
portfolio increased from 28 percent in 2001 to 38 percent in 2004. Our data allow us to investigate 
to what extent these developments in FX lending to corporate and household clients are related to 
changes in the ownership and funding structure of banks. 
Our results contradict the view that foreign banks have been driving FX lending to unsuspecting 
retail clients throughout Eastern Europe as a result of easier access to cross-border funding. First, 
our cross-sectional results suggest that while foreign banks do lend more in FX to corporate clients, 
they do not do so to households. Second, while the foreign acquisition of a bank does lead to faster 
growth in FX lending to retail clients, this is driven by faster growth in household lending per se 
and not by a redirecting of credit from domestic to foreign currency. Third, we find no evidence 
that wholesale funding had a strong causal effect on FX lending for any type of bank over the 2001-
04 period. The correlation between wholesale funding and FX lending at the bank level is weak. If 
anything, wholesale funding seems to be a result rather than a determinant of FX lending.  
All in all, our findings tell us that foreign banks did not indiscriminately ‘push’ FX loans through 
their subsidiary network in the transition region, but followed a more subtle approach where FX 
lending is targeted to (corporate) clients that can carry the associated risks and to countries in which 
FX lending to households is attractive from a macroeconomic perspective. These results provide 
important insights to policy makers into the drivers of FX lending. In particular, they suggest that 
credible macroeconomic policies which encourage depositors to save in local currency may be 
more important than regulatory proposals to limit the wholesale funding of banks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our study to the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on FX lending. Section 3 describes our data and Section 4 presents our 
results. Section 5 sets out our policy conclusions. 
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section we review existing theoretical and empirical studies on the currency denomination of 
bank loans, establish the hypotheses for our empirical analysis, and clarify our contribution to the 
literature. 
2.1. Bank funding 
The share of foreign currency assets held by a bank is typically related to the currency structure of 
its liabilities because banks are limited by prudential regulation in the FX exposure they can take. In 
a country with underdeveloped derivative markets for foreign currency exchange, banks’ supply of 
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FX loans therefore depends on their own access to foreign currency funding from depositors, 
financial markets and/or parent banks. 
Recent evidence for Eastern Europe provides mixed results on the role of bank funding as a driver 
of FX lending. Basso et al. (2010) examine aggregate credit dollarisation for 24 transition countries 
for the period 2000–06. They find that countries in which banks have a higher share of foreign 
funding display a higher share of FX loans. De Haas and Naaborg (2006) and De Haas and Van 
Lelyveld (2006, 2010) show that parent bank funding, typically denominated in FX, influences the 
credit growth of foreign subsidiaries. To the extent that subsidiaries do not swap these funds into 
local currency, access to parent bank funding may have a positive impact on FX lending. 
Luca and Petrova (2008) by contrast find no robust relation between aggregate lending in FX 
across transition countries and aggregate foreign liabilities of banks. They do, however, find a 
strong relation between aggregate levels of deposit dollarisation and FX lending. Similarly, Brown 
et al. (2010) provide loan-level evidence that FX lending is driven by customer funding of banks in 
FX, rather than wholesale funding in FX. 
2.2. Banks’ sensitivity to monetary conditions 
Banks’ willingness to supply FX loans, and borrowers’ demand for such loans, also depends on 
monetary conditions. On the demand side, firms and households are more likely to request FX loans 
when interest differentials are high and real exchange rate volatility is low. Luca and Petrova 
(2008) examine a model of credit dollarisation in which risk-averse banks and firms choose an 
optimal portfolio of foreign and local currency loans. In line with other portfolio-choice models of 
foreign currency debt (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003) they predict that banks offer more foreign 
currency loans when the volatility of domestic inflation is high and the volatility of the real 
exchange rate is low. Thus, in countries where the monetary authority has not established a credible 
reputation for pursuing price stability banks may prefer to make FX loans. As memories of bouts of 
(hyper)inflation are persistent, high inflation may lead to the entrenched use of FX even when 
economies stabilise (Kokenyne et al., 2010). 
Cross-country comparisons of aggregate credit indeed document a strong role for monetary 
conditions in explaining the use of foreign currency in emerging economies. Most recently, Luca 
and Petrova (2008) analyse the aggregate share of FX loans for 21 transition countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1990 and 2003. They find that the aggregate share of 
FX loans is positively related to interest rate differentials and domestic monetary volatility and 
negatively related to the volatility of the exchange rate. Work by Arteta (2002) on a broad sample 
of low-income countries, as well as Barajas and Morales (2003) and Kamil (2009) on Latin 
America, confirms the hypothesis that higher exchange rate volatility reduces credit dollarisation. 
Firm-level studies find more mixed results concerning the impact of monetary conditions on the 
currency composition of firm debt. Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) and Allayanis et al. (2003) find 
that the use of FX debt by corporate firms is strongly related to interest rate differentials. Brown et 
al. (2011) by contrast find only a weak impact of interest rate differentials and no impact of 
exchange rate volatility on the use of FX loans among small firms in transition economies. 
2.3. Bank ownership and client structure 
A bank’s propensity to lend in FX also reflects the demand it encounters for FX loans from its 
clients. This means that to the extent that foreign and domestic banks serve different types of clients 
they may also face a different demand for FX denominated loans. Goswami and Shrikande (2001) 
show theoretically how firms may use foreign currency debt as a hedging instrument for the 
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exchange rate exposure of their revenues.2 Cowan (2006) and Brown et al. (2009b) consider firms’ 
choices of loan currency in models where the cost of foreign currency debt is lower than the cost of 
local currency debt. Cowan (2006) shows that firms are more likely to choose foreign currency debt 
the higher the interest rate differential, the larger their share of income in foreign currency and the 
lower their distress costs in case of default. The incentive to take foreign currency loans is weaker 
when the volatility of the exchange rate is higher, as this increases the default risk on unhedged 
loans. Brown et al. (2009b) show that not only firms with foreign currency income, but also firms 
with high income in local currency (compared to their debt service burden) are more likely to 
choose foreign currency loans, as their probability to default due to exchange rate movements is 
lower. They also examine the impact of bank-firm information asymmetries on loan currency 
choice, showing that when lenders are imperfectly informed about the currency or level of firm 
revenue, local currency borrowers may be more likely to choose foreign currency loans.3 While 
focused on commercial loans, the models of Cowan (2006) and Brown et al. (2009b) are also 
relevant for FX lending to households. They predict that households with assets denominated in 
foreign currency, such as real estate in many countries, as well as households with FX income or 
high income to debt service levels are more likely to borrow in foreign currency. 
A broad set of studies confirm that the use of FX debt is related to borrower characteristics, in 
particular borrower income structure. Large firms have been shown to match loan currencies to 
those of their sales in the US (Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003), Europe (Keloharju and Niskanen, 
2001), Latin America (Martinez and Werner (2002), Gelos (2003), and Benavente et al. ( 2003)) 
and East Asia (Allayannis et al., 2003). 
More recent evidence suggests that the use of a foreign rather than a local currency loan by retail 
clients is also strongly related to borrower characteristics. Brown et al. (2011) examine the currency 
denomination of the most recent loan received by 3,105 small firms in 24 transition countries. They 
find strong evidence that the choice of an FX loan is related to FX cash flow. In contrast, they find 
only weak evidence that FX borrowing is affected by firm-level distress costs or financial 
opaqueness. Brown et al. (2010) examine requested and granted loan currencies using credit-file 
data for over 100,000 loans to small firms in Bulgaria. They show that firms with revenue in 
foreign currency, lower leverage and lower distress costs are more likely to ask for an FX loan, and 
are more likely to receive such a loan. Beer et al. (2010) examine survey data covering over 2,500 
Austrian households and find that those households with higher wealth, higher income and better 
education are more likely to have foreign currency (CHF) rather than local currency (EUR) 
mortgages. Fidrmuc et al. (2011) show that the intention of households to take FX loans in Eastern 
Europe is related to household age, education and savings in FX. Finally, Degryse et al. (2011) 
provide evidence that suggests that FX lending in Poland is related to bank ownership. Examining a 
dataset on Polish banks for the period 1996-2006 they find that in particular greenfield foreign 
banks provide more FX loans than domestic banks. 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on foreign currency lending and borrowing by 
providing bank-level evidence on how FX lending is impacted by banks’ funding structure, 
sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment, and ownership structure. We use our dataset to test 
three main hypotheses: (i) Access to FX denominated wholesale and deposit funding has a positive 
impact on FX lending; (ii) Banks are more likely to lend in FX in countries with instable 
                                                 
2 The model assumes uncovered interest rate parity, i.e. differences in nominal interest rates are cancelled out by changes in the exchange rate 
so that the cost of foreign and local currency borrowing is identical. In such a model interest rate differentials do not motivate foreign currency 
borrowing. However, evidence suggests that this parity does not hold for many currencies (Froot and Thaler (1990) and Isard (2006)). 
3 Banks may not be able to verify the income sources of small firms which do not keep detailed and audited financial records (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). This information asymmetry may be particularly pressing in countries with weak corporate governance (Brown et al., 2009) and 
a strong presence of foreign banks which have less knowledge about local firms (Detragiache et al., 2008). 
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macroeconomic conditions, and (iii) Foreign ownership has an independent positive impact on 
banks’ proportion and quantity of FX lending, e.g. because foreign banks are more likely to attract 
clients with a demand for currency hedging. 
By testing these hypotheses with bank-level data for a broad set of transition economies, we 
provide micro-evidence on FX lending to both firms and households and complement cross-country 
studies of aggregate FX lending such as Luca and Petrova (2008) and Basso et al. (2007), firm-
level and household-level studies such as Brown et al. (2011) and Fidrmuc et al. (2011), as well as 
bank-level studies for individual countries such as Brown et al. (2010) and Degryse et al. (2011). 
3. DATA 
3.1. The Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) 
Our main data source is the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) 
conducted in 2005 across 20 transition countries. The BEPS elicits detailed information on the loan 
and deposit structure, including the currency denomination, of a large number of banks in 2001 and 
2004. Information was also collected on banks’ risk management and their assessment of creditor 
rights and banking regulation. BEPS further provides detailed information on bank ownership, 
which allows us to differentiate between three ownership categories: banks with majority domestic 
ownership, newly created foreign banks (greenfields), and privatized banks with majority foreign 
ownership (takeovers). 
From the 1,976 banks operating in the transition region in 2005 the EBRD approached the 419 
banks which were covered by Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database. These banks represent more 
than three quarters of all banking assets in the transition region. Of these banks 220 agreed to 
participate in the BEPS. There are only small differences between banks that agreed to participate 
in BEPS and those that declined. De Haas et al. (2010) provide a detailed description of the BEPS 
and how it provides a representative picture of the underlying banking population in Emerging 
Europe in terms of bank size and bank ownership. Both in BankScope and in BEPS 7 percent of the 
banks are state-owned and while in BankScope 47 percent of all banks are foreign owned, in BEPS 
55 percent are foreign owned. Finally, while in BankScope 45 percent of all banks are private 
domestic banks, 38 percent of all banks in BEPS belong to this category. There is only a weak 
relationship between bank size and inclusion in BEPS. 
The dataset we use in this paper excludes 27 banks for which information on the currency 
composition of loans was not available. We thus have a sample of 193 banks from 20 countries, of 
which 98 are domestic banks (private or state-owned), 44 greenfield foreign banks, and 51 are 
foreign banks that are the result of a take-over of a former domestic bank. Table 1 shows the 
geographical distribution of these banks over the transition region. The sample is evenly distributed 
over the three main sub-regions: Central Europe and the Baltic countries (62 banks), South Eastern 
Europe (72 banks), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (59 banks). In terms of 
ownership, our sample also reflects that the banking sector in the CIS has seen less foreign direct 
investment compared to the other parts of the transition region. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
From the BEPS we yield four indicators of bank-level foreign currency lending as our dependent 
variables: FX share corporates is the share of a bank’s outstanding loan portfolio to firms which is 
FX denominated. Likewise, FX share households is the share of the outstanding loan portfolio to 
households denominated in FX. We measure both of these variables in 2004 and 2001 and use the 
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2004 values in our cross-sectional analysis and the 2004-01 differences in our panel analysis. In our 
panel analysis we further employ two variables – FX growth corporates and FX growth households 
– that measure the growth of the volume of FX loans over 2001-04. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Figure 1 depicts the 2001 and 2004 values for FX share corporates and FX share households for 
each of the 193 banks in our dataset. It shows a strong correlation between the 2001 and 2004 
proportion of corporate lending in FX. By contrast, during this period many banks experienced 
stronger changes in the currency denomination of their household loan portfolio. On average, the 
share of FX loans to households in our sample increased from 28 percent in 2001 to 38 percent in 
2004. However, as Figure 1 shows, these averages mask substantial heterogeneity in the 
development of household lending across banks. 
 While dynamics in FX lending continued after our sample period ended, we think that the 
period 2001-04 – that is, the first half of the 2001-07 credit boom in many parts of Emerging 
Europe – is well-suited to study the determinants of FX lending as it set the scene for later 
developments. Table A1 in the Appendix displays country-level data on FX lending. It shows that 
in many countries the FX lending dynamics that took place during 2001-04 continued during the 
later years. For instance, our data pick up both the trend towards more FX lending in Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Serbia and the trend towards less FX lending in Albania, Kazakhstan, and 
Russia. Indeed, the overall cross-country correlation between FX lending in 2004 and 2007 is very 
high at 0.79 and between 2007 and 2010 even 0.94. 
3.2. Explanatory variables 
Table 2 provides a description and the source of all variables we use in our empirical analysis. We 
construct bank ownership dummies that indicate whether a bank is a Foreign greenfield bank, a 
Foreign takeover bank, or a Domestic bank in 2004. Information to construct these dummies is 
taken from BEPS and where needed supplemented with information from banks’ websites. We also 
create a variable Foreign held which is 1 for all banks that were foreign-owned throughout 2000-04 
and 0 for all banks that were domestically owned throughout this period. Finally, we construct a 
dummy Foreign acquired that identifies banks acquired in 2000, 2001, or 2002. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
We use BEPS to create two indicators of the funding structure of a bank. FX deposits is taken 
from BEPS and directly captures the share of customer deposits which are FX denominated. 
Wholesale funding is taken from BankScope and captures non-customer liabilities as a share of total 
liabilities. We employ this variable as an indicator of wholesale funding in foreign currency. We 
think this is a reasonable assumption as much of the transition region remains characterised by very 
underdeveloped local currency bond and money markets (EBRD, 2010). As a result, banks find it 
difficult if not impossible to supplement their (mainly short-term) domestic deposit base with 
longer-term local-currency liabilities. Wholesale funding therefore tends to be FX denominated, as 
(the more reputable) banks attract FX debt in the international capital markets or, in the case of 
foreign bank subsidiaries, from their parent banks. De Haas and Naaborg (2006) show how 
centralised Treasuries operated by multinational banks such as SEB, Erste Bank, ING Bank, and 
ABN Amro Bank form the main source of non-deposit funding for the subsidiaries of these banks 
in Emerging Europe. 
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Both our measures of bank funding may be endogenous to FX lending. In our cross-sectional 
analysis we therefore add a specification in which we instrument both. Our instrument for 
Wholesale funding is the variable Internal ratings which indicates whether the bank used an 
internal ratings based approach in 2004. Banks that use such an approach tend to be relatively 
sophisticated and in a better position to attract wholesale funding. Our instrument for FX deposits is 
the variable Corporate deposits which measures the share of customer deposits from firms. FX 
deposits may be directly related to a bank’s focus on corporate clients as (exporting) firms tend to 
have more access to FX and deposit this at their bank. Section 4.1 provides details on our 
instrumentation strategy. 
At the bank-level we control for bank size with the variable Assets which measures total bank 
assets in log USD. This indicator is taken from BankScope and is a measure of both client structure 
and bank-funding structure. On the one hand, larger banks are more likely to serve large firms, 
which may have a higher demand for FX debt. On the other hand, larger banks may have better 
access to cross-border wholesale funding. 
In our empirical analysis we alternatively employ country fixed effects and country-level 
explanatory variables to account for cross-country variation in macroeconomic conditions. Our 
country-level explanatory variables are taken from the EBRD Transition Report and the IMF 
International Financial Statistics. Interest differential is the difference between reference interest 
rates on the domestic currency and the euro. Exrate volatility captures the variation of month-on-
month changes in the nominal exchange rate of the domestic currency to the euro. Interest 
advantage combines the preceding two variables into one summary measure of the relative 
advantage of borrowing in a foreign currency. It divides Interest differential by the Exrate volatility 
(plus 1) and can be seen as a reward-to-variability or Sharpe ratio that measures the benefit of 
borrowing in euro, rather than in the local currency, per unit of exchange rate risk. 
Besides the above measures of contemporary monetary conditions we attempt to control for past 
and future macroeconomic stability which may affect FX lending. Inflation history measures the 
mean annual inflation rate over the preceding period 1994-2003. Lastly, we create a variable EU 
accession which indicates for each country and year in the 2001-04 period whether a country had 
completed EU accession negotiations. This yearly score is then averaged over the sample period. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all our variables. Panel A reports summary statistics for 
the full sample as well as means by bank-ownership and region. Panel B shows summary statistics 
for our country-level variables. Table A2 in the Appendix provides a matrix of pair-wise 
correlations. Table 3 shows that in 2004, 44 percent of all corporate lending and 38 percent of all 
household lending by the banks in our sample was denominated in FX. Differences in the share of 
FX lending are substantial across banks, with some banks displaying no FX loans while other banks 
have their entire loan portfolio in FX. Between 2001 and 2004 there was an average increase of 3 
and 10 percentage points, respectively, in the proportion of corporate and household loans 
denominated in FX. 
The table confirms that foreign banks lend more in FX. However, there is a marked difference 
between lending to firms and to households. For corporate clients we see that in 2004 both 
greenfield and takeover foreign banks display a higher share of FX lending than domestic banks. 
Interestingly, the share of FX loans to firms by takeover banks converges to that of greenfield banks 
between 2001 and 2004, while FX lending by domestic banks to firms did not increase. For 
household loans we find that the share of FX lending increased strongly for all ownership types. In 
contrast to corporate lending, we also find that in 2004 the share of household loans in FX is similar 
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for foreign takeover banks and domestic banks with both bank types displaying a lower level of FX 
loans than foreign greenfield banks.4 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Looking at banks’ funding structure, we find that on average 32 percent of total liabilities is 
Wholesale funding, while 42 percent of bank deposits are denominated in FX. Greenfield foreign 
banks rely much more on wholesale funding (44 percent) compared to foreign takeover banks (29 
percent) or domestic banks (28 percent). By contrast, the foreign currency share of deposits is 
similar for all bank types, indicating that the “euroisation” of deposits is mostly driven by the 
macroeconomic environment. Interestingly, during 2001-04 the share of FX deposits in total 
deposits declined by about four percentage points. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
To what extent is FX lending by the banks in our sample related to their funding structure? The 
scatter plots in Figure 2 provide some first insights into this issue. The figure shows no apparent 
bivariate relationship between the proportion of wholesale funding and FX lending. By contrast, 
banks with a large share of FX denominated customer deposits lend more in FX. In line with this, 
Table A2 in the Appendix shows that whereas the pair-wise correlation between wholesale funding 
and corporate and household FX lending is only 0.16 (p=0.04) and 0.13 (p=0.09), respectively, the 
correlations between the proportion of FX deposits and both types of FX lending are 0.44 (p=0.00) 
and 0.43 (p=0.00). This is in line with findings by Brown et al. (2010) and Fidrmuc et al. (2011) on 
the importance of FX deposits for FX lending. 
4. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
The cross-sectional and panel analyses in this section examine to what extent there is a causal 
relationship between foreign ownership, bank funding and FX lending. 
4.1. Cross-sectional variation in FX lending 
Table 4 provides a cross-sectional analysis of banks’ share of FX lending to corporate clients (left-
hand panel) and households (right-hand panel) in 2004. In line with the hypotheses developed in 
Section 2, we analyse the impact of bank ownership, bank-funding and the macroeconomic 
environment. The first column in each panel displays an OLS specification in which the share of 
FX lending is explained by bank ownership, bank funding and bank size. 
In columns (2,7) we account for the endogeneity of a bank’s funding structure by instrumenting 
our variables Wholesale funding and FX deposits with Internal rating and Corporate deposits, 
respectively. Our analysis suggests that the chosen instruments are valid, strong, and span our 
endogenous regressors. When we run second-stage regressions where we add these instruments as 
additional regressors they do not have an independent impact on FX lending, suggesting that the 
instruments are valid. Our instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous regressors in the 
first-stage regressions and thus relatively strong. Finally, the reported Kleibergen-Paap statistics 
                                                 
4 Degryse et al. (2011) also find that in particular greenfield foreign banks provide more FX loans than domestic banks. 
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show that our regression specification is not underidentified. Table A3 in the Appendix reports the 
first-stage results of our instrumental variable analysis.  
In columns (3-4) and (8-9) we add to this IV specification country-level indicators of the 
macroeconomic environment. Finally, in columns (5) and (10) we interact these macroeconomic 
indicators with foreign bank ownership to examine whether foreign banks react differently to 
contemporaneous monetary conditions and long-term macroeconomic stability.5 As these two 
specifications also contain country fixed effects, we do not include the macroeconomic indicators 
as stand-alone variables but only when interacted with the bank-ownership variables. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Table 4 displays four key findings. First, foreign ownership is associated with a higher share of 
FX loans to firms but not to households. Columns (2-4) show that greenfield (takeover) foreign 
banks lend 17 (12) percentage points more in FX than domestic banks. In sharp contrast, bank 
ownership does not impact FX lending to households. Why do foreign banks lend more in FX to 
firms but not to households? One reason may be that households are a relatively homogenous 
borrower group whereas firms are more diverse. Foreign banks may serve a different set of 
corporate clients with a higher demand for FX loans, for instance because they are larger and better 
diversified or because they have FX revenues that need to be hedged. Indeed, the BEPS data 
indicate that foreign banks lend significantly more to subsidiaries of international firms than 
domestic banks (see also De Haas et al. 2010). 
Our second finding is that Wholesale funding of banks seems to be a result rather than a 
determinant of FX lending. The coefficients in columns (1) and (6) suggest that there is a relation 
between wholesale funding and FX lending. However, once we account for the endogeneity of 
wholesale funding (by instrumenting it with Internal rating) its coefficient is no longer significant 
at any conventional level. 
Our third finding is that there does seem to be a causal impact of foreign denominated customer 
deposits on FX lending. The coefficients reported in columns (1) and (6), respectively, suggest that 
a 10 percentage point increase in FX deposits by customers increases the share of FX loans to firms 
by 5 percent and to households by 7 percent. Not surprisingly, the impact on FX share corporates 
loses statistical and economic significance once we account for the potential endogeneity of 
deposits. This indicates that FX deposits is partially endogenous, as FX lending to (international) 
firms and access to FX deposits by these firms is determined simultaneously. 
Interestingly, and in line with this interpretation, the same instrumentation strategy does not 
reduce the significance of FX deposits in the right-hand panel. In the case of lending to households, 
access to FX deposits is exogenous and has a causal impact on FX lending to retail clients. Note, 
however, that the coefficient becomes insignificant once we include country fixed effects in column 
(10). Our result is thus mainly driven by between-country variation in FX deposits rather than 
between-bank variation in access to FX deposits within countries. The impact of FX denominated 
customer deposits on the share of FX lending to households confirms recent findings by Brown et 
al. (2010) and Luca and Petrova (2008). 
Our fourth finding is that long-term macroeconomic conditions rather than contemporaneous 
monetary conditions affect FX lending. In particular, we find that banks in countries with a history 
                                                 
5 Since some banks provide no FX loans at all, we also ran models were we first estimate a probit regression and then a conditional OLS. This 
yields similar results to the unconditional OLS results reported in Table 4. The same holds when we estimate Tobit regressions. Note that the 
proportion of FX lending is naturally bound between 0 and 100 and not truly censored, which makes OLS a more appropriate estimation 
technique than Tobit regressions.  
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of high inflation (over the period 1994-2003) show a higher proportion of FX lending. This may 
suggest that in countries with “inflation traumas” banks are more reluctant to lend in local currency. 
An alternative explanation is that FX lending is related to a history of real appreciation of the local 
currency. Our data show that in Emerging Europe high levels of past inflation are associated with 
real appreciation of the local currency. Indeed, when we replace the variable Past inflation in Table 
4 with the variable Trend appreciation, which measures the mean real appreciation of the local 
currency over the period 1994-2003, we find that FX lending is indeed higher in countries that have 
experienced trend appreciation in the past. 
For FX lending to firms we also find that progress with EU accession, and the associated 
macroeconomic and institutional stabilization, had a positive effect on the proportion of FX lending. 
Progress towards EU accession may somewhat paradoxically have increased the incentives for 
denominating debt in FX as the ‘certainty’ of a euro exit, and the expectation of nominal exchange 
rate stability during the convergence trajectory, made FX lending more attractive even when 
interest-rate differences came down at the same time. Indeed, in line with recent evidence by Brown 
et al. (2009), we find that neither interest-rate differentials nor nominal exchange-rate volatility is 
significantly related to FX lending. The main macroeconomic determinants seem to be past 
inflation and real appreciation as well as the expected stabilisation of EU accession. 
In columns (5) and (10) we examine whether FX lending by foreign banks is more sensitive to the 
macroeconomic environment. Foreign banks may be more reluctant to lend in domestic currency if 
they mistrust macroeconomic policy more than domestic banks. We therefore interact our 
macroeconomic indicators with the dummy variable Foreign, which is 1 for greenfield and takeover 
foreign banks (while also including country fixed effects).6 Our results suggest that foreign banks 
are not significantly more sensitive to the host-country macroeconomic environment than domestic 
banks. 
Throughout much of Central and South-eastern Europe the euro has been the main currency used 
for FX lending and we have therefore calculated our variables Interest rate differential, Exrate 
volatility, and Interest advantage relative to euro interest and exchange rates. However, in a number 
of countries many FX loans are denominated in either the Swiss franc (Hungary and Poland)7 or the 
US dollar (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine). As a robustness test we therefore 
ran the regressions in Table 4 while replacing the exchange rate of the local currency vis-à-vis the 
euro with the exchange rate vis-à-vis the Swiss franc or the US dollar for the countries mentioned 
above. Our results remain virtually unchanged in terms of economic and statistical significance, 
reflecting the co-movement of these foreign currencies relative to the currencies of Emerging 
Europe during 2001-04. 
Summing up, our cross-sectional results contradict widespread views concerning foreign bank 
ownership, bank funding and FX lending. First, we find that foreign banks lend more in FX to 
corporate clients but not to retail clients. Second, we find only a very weak relationship between 
wholesale funding and FX lending, with the former being a result, rather than a determinant of the 
latter. These results are remarkable as they run counter to the view that foreign banks, using cheap 
funding from abroad, have been ‘pushing’ FX loans into the hands of unsuspecting retail borrowers. 
We further find that long-term macroeconomic stability (past inflation/trend appreciation and EU 
accession) rather than contemporaneous monetary conditions are associated with persistently high 
shares of FX lending by both domestic and foreign banks. Indirectly, the macroeconomic 
                                                 
6 We do not distinguish between greenfield and takeover foreign banks here because unreported regression results show no significant 
differences in the interaction effects between these two types of foreign banks. 
7 Brown et al. (2009c) show that Poland and Hungary are the only two transition economies with a significant share of foreign currency loans 
denominated in Swiss Francs. 
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environment may play an important a role as well. We find that between countries –but not so much 
within countries– a higher proportion of FX deposits is linked to higher proportions of FX lending, 
in particular to households. As shown by De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2005) the macroeconomic 
environment is a key driver of deposit dollarisation.  
4.2. Foreign ownership and changes in banks’ FX lending over time 
It is difficult to establish a causal relationship between bank ownership or funding and FX lending 
from our cross-sectional results alone. First, the observed impact of customer funding may be 
driven by omitted bank characteristics, e.g. customers with income in FX, which affect both FX 
deposits and FX lending. Second, the observed impact of (long-term) macroeconomic instability 
may be driven by unobserved country characteristics, e.g. institutional weaknesses which may be 
correlated with both weak macroeconomic policies and the absence of (exporting) firms which 
demand FX loans. Third, the observed relation between foreign bank ownership and FX lending to 
corporate clients may be due to reverse causality. Foreign banks may be more likely to enter 
countries where there are more clients with a demand for financial services in foreign currency, i.e. 
countries with more export-oriented firms or a real estate market that is denominated in euro. 
Foreign institutions may also be more likely to take over domestic banks that already have a 
clientele that use financial services in foreign currency.8 In this section, we try to mitigate concerns 
about omitted variables and reverse causality by looking at changes in banks’ FX lending between 
2001 and 2004, controlling for time-invariant bank characteristics and changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. 
In Table 5 we control for omitted bank-level variables by running first-difference regressions 
using a sub-sample of banks that did not change their ownership during 2000-04. We examine 
changes in the share and the volume of FX lending between 2001 and 2004. The dependent 
variables in the left-hand side panel are the percentage-point change in FX share corporate/ 
households between 2001 and 2004.9 The dependent variables in the right-hand side panel are FX 
growth corporates / households, i.e. the percentage-point change in the volume of FX lending to 
these clients. Likewise all independent variables – with the obvious exception of the Foreign held 
dummy – are expressed in changes as well. We control for changes in country specific monetary 
conditions with country fixed effects. The results presented in Table 5 suggest that foreign bank 
ownership did not impact the change in either the share or the volume of FX lending to firms or 
households. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.3. Foreign acquisition and changes in banks’ FX lending over time 
In Table 6 we control for reverse causality in the observed relationship between foreign bank 
ownership and FX lending by analysing whether the currency composition of bank lending changes 
when a domestic bank is taken over by a foreign strategic investor. As in Table 5, the dependent 
variables are the percentage-point change in FX share corporates / households (left-hand side) and 
FX growth corporate / households (right-hand side). To measure the impact of foreign acquisition 
                                                 
8 For foreign banks like ABN Amro, Bank Austria, and Raiffeisen, serving foreign firms – in particular home-country clients – has been an 
important part of their expansion strategy into Emerging Europe (De Haas and Naaborg, 2006). 
9 A number of banks change their proportion of FX lending very considerably between 2001 and 2004. We undertook a robustness test where 
we exclude extreme values in the dependent variables by trimming at the 5th and 95th percentile. This does not change our results. 
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we limit our sample to those banks which were domestically owned before 2000 and compare 
banks that remained domestically owned over 2000-04 to those that were taken over by a foreign 
bank in 2000, 2001, or 2002. The latter are captured by the dummy Foreign acquired.10 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
The results presented in Panel A of Table 6 suggest that there is no effect of foreign acquisition 
on FX lending to corporates. The coefficients for Foreign Acquired in columns (1-2) and (5-6) 
suggest that neither the share of bank lending in FX nor the growth of the FX loan volume to 
corporate clients differs between acquired and non-acquired banks.  
The foreign acquisition of a domestic bank does, by contrast, impact FX lending to households. 
The results in columns (7-8) suggest that after a take-over, acquired banks expand the volume of 
FX lending to households by almost 10 percentage points more than banks that remain in domestic 
hands. Interestingly though, the stronger increase in FX loan volume to households does not appear 
to be driven by an increase in the share of household loans extended in FX. The results displayed in 
columns (3-4) suggest that foreign acquisition has no impact on FX share households. These results 
suggest that the main effect of foreign acquisition is to accelerate the growth of household lending 
by banks. This leads to a faster growth of FX loans to households, even though the share of FX 
loans in the household loan portfolio does not increase. 
A concern with our analysis in Panel A of Table 6 is selection bias. Foreign institutions choose to 
takeover particular domestic banks. If our regressions omit indicators which are relevant for the 
takeover decision, and these indicators are positively correlated with initial FX lending, then we 
may underestimate the impact of foreign acquisition on the subsequent change in FX lending. In 
Table 6B we therefore report a propensity scoring exercise in which we attempt to mitigate 
potential selection bias by comparing banks that were taken over by a foreign bank with similar 
banks that were not taken over (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).11 
In a first step we run a probit regression on the sub-sample of domestic banks in 2000 in which 
the dependent variable is Foreign acquired. This probit regression yields a propensity score (the 
conditional probability of a bank being acquired given pre-acquisition characteristics) for each 
bank. As explanatory variables in the first-step regression we include bank size and country fixed 
effects. We expect that acquiring banks are mainly interested in large banks, as they search for a 
minimum presence and scale in a country. The first-stage probit regression results (available upon 
request from the authors) show that bank size is indeed an important determinant of the acquisition 
probability. In addition, various country fixed effects are significant, indicating that foreign 
strategic investors targeted particular countries more than others, for instance because of a higher 
credit-growth potential and a better institutional environment.  
In a second step we match each ‘treated’ (acquired) bank to similar banks that were not acquired 
by a strategic investor. We either match an acquired bank to the closest propensity score (nearest 
neighbour match with a common-support requirement) or use Gaussian kernel matching.12 The 
results in Table 6B confirm our finding of Table 6A that over the 2001-04 period acquired banks 
expanded their FX loan volume (but not their FX loan share) to households significantly faster than 
                                                 
10 Our definition of Foreign acquired implies that after a takeover in 2000, 2001, or 2002 there are four, three, and two years, respectively, 
during which the integration into a multinational group may have influenced the FX lending of these banks. This should be enough time to 
pick up an effect of foreign ownership as the parent bank may in principle start providing its new subsidiary with intrabank funding as soon as 
the takeover is finalised. 
11 See Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2010) for a similar application to investigate the impact of foreign bank ownership on the performance and 
market power of acquired banks. 
12 In the latter case the counterfactual outcome is calculated as a kernel-weighted average of the outcomes of all non-acquired banks. Weights 
are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of acquired and non-acquired banks. 
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banks that remained in domestic hands. Again, we find no relation between foreign acquisition and 
changes in FX lending to corporate clients. 
4.4. Convergence of FX lending within countries and multinational banks 
In this section we examine the role of foreign banks in spreading FX lending within countries (to 
domestic banks). We also examine their role in spreading FX lending across countries through their 
multinational networks. Panel A of Table 7 displays the results for within-country and Panel B for 
within-network dispersion of FX lending. 
Panel A reports regressions on our sample of banks for which information on FX lending is 
available for 2001 and 2004. We relate the change in FX share corporate / households over the 
2001-04 period to the dummy variable Low FX 2001 in country which is 1 if in 2001 a bank had a 
lower proportion of FX lending compared to the country average. As in Tables 5 and 6 we control 
for cross-country variation in changes in macroeconomic conditions through country fixed-effects. 
The results provide evidence for convergence of FX lending within countries. Banks with below-
average levels of FX lending in 2001 increased the share of FX loans the fastest between 2001 and 
2004. A bank that had below-average FX lending in 2001 subsequently increased its proportion of 
FX lending to firms and households by 14 and 18 per cent more, respectively, compared to banks in 
the same country that had above average shares of FX loans in 2001. 
Király et al. (2009) point out that in the case of Hungary the combination of foreign-bank 
ownership and intense inter-bank competition was a key determinant of FX lending. Did foreign 
banks start the euroisation process while intense competition merely forced domestic banks to 
follow their foreign competitors? We find no evidence that the catching up effect identified above is 
driven in particular by domestic or foreign banks. In columns (2,3) and (5,6) we examine whether 
foreign banks spread FX lending to domestic banks during our observation period. We interact the 
variable Low FX 2001 in country with a Foreign held dummy, which is one for banks that were 
already foreign owned in 2000, or a Foreign acquired dummy, which is one for banks that became 
foreign owned in 2000, 2001, or 2002. These results are in line with banking competition increasing 
FX lending as a two-way rather than as a unidirectional process. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
In Panel B of Table 7 we examine whether foreign banks spread FX lending across countries 
through their multinational networks. For this exercise we analyse a sub-sample of banks which 
belong to a multinational banking group – such as UniCredit Group, Raiffeisen International, or 
Société Générale – for which we have at least three subsidiaries from the group in our sample. We 
relate changes in FX share corporates / households between 2001 and 2004 to a dummy variable 
Low FX 2001 within network which is 1 for subsidiaries with a proportion of FX lending below the 
2001 average for the group they belong to. As in Panel A we find positive coefficients for the 
variable Low FX 2001 although the estimates are not precisely estimated. We cannot conclude that 
during our observation period multinational banking groups used their internal capital markets to 
spread FX lending throughout their network. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We use a unique dataset – containing detailed information on the loan and deposit structure of 
nearly 200 banks in 20 transition economies – to examine how FX lending is related to bank 
ownership, bank funding, and the macroeconomic environment. We focus on the extent to which 
FOREIGN CURRENCY LENDING  16 
 
 
 
foreign-owned banks and wholesale funding have contributed to the widespread use of FX lending 
in Emerging Europe. 
Overall our results contradict the view that foreign-owned banks have been driving FX lending to 
unsuspecting retail clients throughout Eastern Europe as a result of easier access to cross-border 
wholesale funding. First, our cross-sectional results suggest that while foreign banks do lend more 
in FX to corporate clients, they do not do so to retail clients. Second, while foreign acquisition of a 
bank does lead to faster growth in FX lending to households, this is driven by faster growth in 
household lending per se, and not be a redirecting of household credit from domestic to foreign 
currency. Third, we find no evidence that wholesale funding had a strong causal effect on FX 
lending for any type of bank over the 2001-04 period. The correlation between wholesale funding 
and FX lending at the bank level is weak, and if anything wholesale funding seems to be a result 
rather than a determinant of FX lending.  
Our results also contradict the view that foreign bank presence spread the FX lending to domestic 
banks in Emerging Europe. We do find evidence for a within-country convergence process of FX 
lending. However, we show that both foreign and domestic banks with low levels of FX lending in 
2001 –compared to the country average– let their FX lending increase faster over the subsequent 
three years. Finally, at the country level, our results suggest that banks’ FX lending is driven by 
long-term macroeconomic stability rather than contemporaneous monetary conditions. In particular, 
a history of high inflation and prospective EU accession are associated with high levels of 
euroisation. Again, this holds for both domestic and foreign banks. 
All in all, our findings tell us that foreign banks did not indiscriminately ‘push’ FX loans through 
their subsidiary network in the transition region, but followed a more cautionary approach where 
FX lending is targeted to (corporate) clients that can carry the associated risks and to countries in 
which FX lending to households is attractive from a macroeconomic and institutional perspective. 
Our results provide important insights to policy makers into the drivers of FX lending in Eastern 
Europe. They show that FX customer deposits rather than wholesale funding have been a key driver 
of FX lending in the region. This suggests that credible macroeconomic policies which encourage 
customers to save in local currency may in many countries be more important than regulatory 
proposals to limit the wholesale funding of (foreign) banks. 
Indeed, countries like the Czech Republic and Poland demonstrate how adherence to credible 
macroeconomic policies can result in relatively low levels of FX lending even when a majority of 
the banking system is foreign owned. Similarly, various Latin American countries have 
successfully de-dollarised by moving to macroeconomic regimes that were more conducive to local 
currency funding, including flexible exchange rate regimes and inflation targeting (see Zettelmeyer 
et al., 2010). Having said that, our results also indicate that macroeconomic stabilisation within the 
framework of a credible political commitment to eventual euro adoption, may actually stimulate 
firms and households to disregard any residual currency risk and expand their FX borrowing. 
In countries with weak monetary and fiscal institutions a strong regulatory response to reduce FX 
lending may even be counterproductive as lending in domestic currency is not a realistic alternative 
in the short term. In those cases, reducing FX lending through regulation may just lead to less 
credit. The current policies in Ukraine and Belarus, where new FX denominated mortgages 
(Ukraine) or all FX retail loans (Belarus) have been banned, may come at the cost of an even 
sharper decline in bank lending. 
This is not to say that regulation can or should not play a role in reducing FX lending. In a 
second-best world where monetary credibility is not instantly attainable, regulation may be an 
optimal instrument, at least for some time. Regulation may well be advisable if banks and their 
customers create (unhedged) FX debt whilst disregarding that growing currency mismatches may 
increase the probability of a systemic crisis. Such behaviour may become apparent when banks 
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count on an explicit or implicit government commitment to maintain nominal exchange rate 
stability (see Rancière et al., 2010) such as in the run up to euro membership. In such cases, 
regulators may for instance require banks to hold unremunerated reserve requirements on their FX 
funding or may introduce higher capital and/or provisioning requirements for FX loans. Poland has 
been successful in weighing against the tide of FX lending by introducing Recommendation S in 
2006, which required banks to apply stricter credit underwriting standards and to disclose FX risks 
when providing FX mortgages. Measures like these may partially restore a level playing field 
between FX and local currency loans and force banks and their borrowers to take the externalities 
of their lending decisions into account. 
Finally, we should underline that our empirical analysis has focused quite narrowly on the impact 
of bank funding and ownership on the currency composition of credit across Emerging Europe. 
Even though we do not find that foreign banks have had a strong influence on the share of FX 
lending, we do find that they have been instrumental in pushing the amount of household lending 
(both in local and foreign currencies). Given the underdeveloped nature of mortgage and consumer 
credit markets across Emerging Europe this development should in principle be viewed positively, 
as it has allowed households to better smooth consumption over time. Yet, previous crises in 
emerging markets as well as developed countries have shown that episodes of rapid financial 
deepening may turn into self-fulfilling and unsustainable credit booms. Indeed, many countries in 
Emerging Europe – including the Baltic States, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan – are still recovering from 
burst credit and real estate bubbles. To the extent that foreign banks played a particular role in 
financing these bubbles – again: regardless of the currency of denomination of this financing – they 
may still have contributed to financial instability. We leave this issue, as well as the role that access 
to finance has played in shaping households’ ability to cope with the crisis, for future research. 
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This figure plots the 2001 values against the 2004 values for the variables FX share corporates and FX share 
households . Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
Figure 1.  FX lending in 2001 and 2004
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This figure plots FX share corporates and FX share households against Wholesale funding and FX deposits. All data
refer to 2004. For comparability with Figure 1 we include only banks with observations for FX share corporates and
FX share households  in 2004 and 2001. Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
Figure 2.  FX lending and bank funding in 2004
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Total Foreign 
greenfield
Foreign 
takeover
Domestic Foreign 
acquired 
Central Europe  & Baltics 
(CEB)
62 15 26 21 15
Czech Republic 7 0 4 3 3
Estonia 5 0 4 1 1
Hungary 3 3 0 0 0
Latvia 16 1 6 9 2
Lith i 5 0 3 2 2
The table reports the number of banks in our sample by country and ownership type. Foreign greenfield
banks are foreign banks established from scratch, whereas Foreign takeover banks are foreign banks that are
the result of a takeover of a domestic bank by a foreign strategic investor. Foreign acquired banks are
takeover banks that were acquired in 2000, 2001, or 2002. Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all
variables.
Table 1.  Bank ownership by country
uan a
Poland 13 7 4 2 3
Slovak Republic 6 3 3 0 2
Slovenia 7 1 2 4 2
South Eastern Europe (SEE)
72 22 22 28 13
Albania 4 3 1 1
Bosnia 11 3 4 4 2
Bulgaria 11 3 6 2 5
Croatia 11 4 1 6 1
Macedonia 6 0 2 4 2
Romania 11 5 5 1 2
Serbia 18 4 3 11 0
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)
59 7 3 49 0
Belarus 9 1 2 6 0
Kazakhstan 7 0 0 7 0
Moldova 8 0 1 7 0
Russia 27 3 0 24 0
Ukraine 8 3 0 5 0
Total 193 44 51 98 28
Variable name Periodicity Description Source
FX share corporates 2001, 2004 Share of FX loans in all loans to corporations (%) BEPS
FX share households 2001, 2004 Share of FX loans in all loans to households (%) BEPS
FX growth corporates 2004 Growth of the volume of FX loans to corporations 2004 minus 2001 (%) BEPS
FX growth households 2004 Growth of the volume of FX loans to households 2004 minus 2001 (%) BEPS
Foreign greenfield 2004 1= bank is a newly established 'greenfield' foreign bank, 0= otherwise BEPS, websites
Foreign takeover 2004 1= bank is a foreign bank resulting from a take‐over, 0= otherwise BEPS, websites
Domestic 2004 1= bank is domestically owned, 0=otherwise BEPS, websites
Foreign held 2000‐2004 1= if bank was foreign owned from 2000‐2004, 0= bank was domestically owned from 2000‐2004. BEPS, websites
1= domestic bank was acquired by a foreign investor in 2000, 2001 or 2002, 0= domestic bank was not acquired 
Table 2. Variable descriptions
Bank‐level data (# banks = 193)
This table presents definitions and sources of all variables used in our empirical analysis. BEPS is the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey conducted in 2005.
BankScope is Bureau van Dijk's BankScope database of bank balance sheet and income statement data. EBRD-TR is the EBRD Transition Report 2004. IMF-IFS are the International
Financial Statistics provided by the International Monetary Fund.
Foreign acquired 2000‐2004 in the period 2000‐2004. BEPS, websites
Assets 2001, 2004 Total assets (in log US dollars) BankScope
Wholesale funding 2001, 2004 Non‐customer liabilities as a share of total bank liabilities (%) BankScope
FX deposits 2001, 2004 Share of FX denominated customer deposits in all customer deposits (%) BEPS
Corporate deposits 2004 Share of customer deposits from corporates (%) BEPS
Internal ratings 2004 Bank uses internal ratings approach for credit risk assessment (yes=1, no=0) BEPS
Interest  differential 2001‐2004 Domestic Tbill or money market rate minus Eurepo rate (% p.a.) IMF‐IFS
Exrate volatility 2001‐2004 Coefficient of variation of monthly changes in nominal exchange rate to the euro (%) IMF‐IFS
Interest advantage 2001‐2004 Interest differential  / (1 +Exrate volatility ) IMF‐IFS
Inflation history 1994‐2003 Mean annual cpi inflation rate over the period 1994‐2003 EBRD‐TR
EU accession 2001‐2004 EU accession negotiations completed (yes=1, no=0) EBRD‐TR
Country‐level data  (# countries = 20)
Variable name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Greenfield Takeover Domestic CEB SEE CIS
FX share corporates 179 44.0 28.9 0 100 51.3 50.4 37.6 44.6 45.2 42.0
FX share households 174 38.0 36.1 0 100 45.7 36.1 35.5 32.0 36.1 46.1
Assets 187 20.0 1.6 16 24.1 20.1 20.7 19.7 20.9 19.5 19.8
Wholesale funding 187 31.9 22.2 1 99 44.0 28.6 27.8 34.4 27.8 34.0
FX deposits 176 41.7 23.6 0 99 43.0 37.2 43.4 34.9 49.3 39.8
Corporate deposits 177 45.1 24.7 0 100 49.5 39.0 46.1 43.4 43.2 49.4
Internal ratings 178 0 80 0 40 0 1 0 80 0 84 0 78 0 74 0 79 0 89
 Full sample summary statistics Means by bank‐ownership
Panel A.  Bank-level variables
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics
Means by region
Cross‐sectional analysis:  2004
This table provides summary statistics for the 2004 values and 2004-2001 differences of our bank-level and country-level variables. Region definitions CEB,
SEE and CIS are in accordance with those listed in Table 1. Table 2 provides variable definitions and sources.
  . . . . . . . .
FX share corporates 166 2.5 20.4 ‐54 98 0.7 10.0 ‐0.1 5.3 4.2 ‐2.1
FX share households 158 9.8 32.4 ‐95 100 11.5 9.6 9.2 3.2 10.9 15.3
FX growth corporates 127 6.7 26.1 ‐1 270 12.6 8.2 3.1 3.6 14.0 3.2
FX growth households 77 4.7 5.9 ‐1 33 4.1 6.1 4.2 4.0 5.4 5.0
Assets 155 1.0 0.5 ‐0.7 2.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
Wholesale funding 155 3.0 15.3 ‐42 50 4.5 5.4 0.9 4.1 4.0 0.6
FX deposits 167 ‐4.1 16.0 ‐52 62 ‐3.4 ‐2.1 ‐5.5 ‐2.4 ‐4.2 ‐5.9
Variable name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CEB SEE CIS
Interest differential 20 6.9 9.2 0.4 37.4 2.9 7.8 12.0
Exrate volatility 20 2.8 2.1 0.0 8.0 2.1 1.8 5.2
Interest advantage 20 1.7 1.5 0.1 4.8 0.9 2.5 1.6
Inflation history 20 60 93 2 371 11 42 165
EU accession 20 0.2 0.3 0 0.5 0.5 0 0
Country‐level variables:  2001‐2004 averages
Panel B.  Country-level variables
Panel analysis: 2004 minus 2001
 Full sample summary statistics Means by region
Dependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Foreign greenfield 0.982 16.010 17.18* 17.71* 16.680 0.909 ‐2.370 6.139 2.801 ‐15.980
[8.907] [9.839] [10.35] [10.24] [16.27] [9.954] [10.99] [10.55] [10.50] [20.87]
Foreign takeover 7.423 12.53** 12.73** 12.02** 15.550 1.224 3.559 11.000 5.832 ‐8.570
[7.562] [6.248] [6.282] [5.749] [13.40] [7.749] [9.062] [8.412] [8.136] [15.30]
Assets 1.236 1.196 0.055 0.057 1.288 2.107 3.346 1.760 2.366 1.931
[2.221] [1.712] [1.704] [1.690] [2.289] [2.546] [2.113] [1.950] [1.857] [2.852]
Wholesale funding 0.382** ‐0.415 ‐0.365 ‐0.363 0.100 0.378** 0.390 0.207 0.334 0.442
[0.143] [0.485] [0.467] [0.464] [0.504] [0.161] [0.558] [0.483] [0.494] [0.672]
FX deposits 0 456*** 0 735* 0 512 0 489 0 183 0 735*** 1 329*** 1 096*** 1 071*** 0 895
Table 4.  FX lending in 2004
FX share corporates FX share households
In this table the dependent variables are FX share corporates and FX share households in 2004. Models (1,6) report OLS estimates in which standard
errors are adjusted for clustering by country. Models (2-5, 7-10) report IV estimates with robust standard errors in which Wholesale funding and FX 
deposits are instrumented with the variables Internal ratings and Corporate deposits . Models (5,10) include country fixed effects. Standard errors are
reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Tabel 2 provides the definitions and sources of all variables. Table A3
in the Annex provides diagnostic tests related to the instrumentation strategy.
  . . . . . . . . . .
[0.119] [0.435] [0.390] [0.401] [0.605] [0.0713] [0.471] [0.362] [0.370] [0.636]
Interest differential 0.365 ‐0.422
[0.408] [0.461]
Exrate volatility 1.177 7.069***
[1.837] [2.302]
Interest advantage 1.219 ‐0.961
[1.619] [1.896]
Inflation history 0.0602* 0.0989*** 0.045 0.119***
[0.0337] [0.0280] [0.0423] [0.0313]
EU accession 20.21* 22.18* 7.121 7.103
[11.86] [12.14] [14.18] [15.17]
Foreign*Interest advantage ‐5.367 5.549
[5.106] [4.821]
Foreign*Inflation history 0.103 ‐0.057
[0.0643] [0.0668]
Foreign*EU accession ‐12.740 30.280
[33.21] [35.60]
Method OLS IV IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV IV
Country fixed effects no no no no yes no no no no yes
R2 0.53 0.06 0.20 0.18 0.50 0.24 0.11 0.33 0.27 0.53
# Banks 155 155 155 155 155 151 151 151 151 151
# countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Dependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign held 5.065 9.8 2.596 0.325 14.82 12.88 1.128 1.087
[5.389] [6.017] [5.834] [6.779] [14.96] [12.80] [1.455] [1.538]
Bank‐level changes 2004‐01:
Assets 0.503 3.744
[2.822] [11.53]
Table 5.  Foreign ownership and changes in FX lending (2001-2004)
Households
FX share (2004 minus 2001) FX growth
In this panel we examine the sample of banks that were either domestically owned or foreign owned during the entire period 2000-
2004 and which report data on FX lending for 2001 and 2004. The dependent variables are the percentage point changes (2004 minus
2001) in either the share of FX lending (columns 1-4) or in the amount of FX lending (columns 5-8). All models report OLS estimates
with country fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
Corporates Households Corporates
Wholesale funding 0.0081 0.238 0.208 ‐0.0167
[0.111] [0.272] [0.192] [0.0257]
FX deposits ‐0.0494 0.383 0.063 0.0409
[0.152] [0.253] [0.108] [0.0355]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.23 0.37 0.39 0.45 0.22 0.27 0.37 0.44
# Banks 135 106 126 99 102 96 62 58
# countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 14
Dependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign acquired ‐4.859 ‐5.388 2.229 ‐0.577 1.046 1.926 8.724** 9.831**
[4.759] [7.663] [5.005] [8.352] [2.001] [2.305] [3.789] [3.804]
Bank‐level changes 2004‐01:
Panel A. OLS regressions
Table 6.  Foreign acquisition and changes in FX lending (2001-2004)
Households
FX share (2004 minus 2001) FX growth
In this panel we compare the change in FX lending (2004 minus 2001) by domestic banks which were acquired in 2000, 2001 or 2002
to the change in FX lending by domestic banks that were not acquired. The dependent variables are percentage point changes in the
share of FX lending (columns 1-4) or the growth (2004 minus 2001) of FX volume in % (columns 5-8). All models report OLS
estimates with country fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***,
**, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
Corporates Households Corporates
Assets ‐2.155 ‐3.571
[3.479] [7.537]
Wholesale funding 0.151 0.195 ‐0.00955 ‐0.0565
[0.175] [0.271] [0.0651] [0.0609]
FX deposits ‐0.0253 0.13 ‐0.0533** 0.0702*
[0.239] [0.134] [0.0237] [0.0339]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.21 0.32 0.42 0.52 0.19 0.28 0.44 0.75
# Banks 117 89 115 87 90 82 60 54
# countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 14 14
FX share (2004 minus 2001) Acquired Not Acquired Difference S.E. T‐stat
Corporates Unmatched 2.82 4.91 ‐2.09 5.29 ‐0.39
Nearest neighbour matching 2.28 8.37 ‐6.09 9.78 ‐0.62
Kernel matching 5.84 5.83 0.01 6.99 0.00
Households Unmatched 2.52 1.83 0.69 6.23 0.11
Nearest neighbour matching 3.02 5.71 ‐2.69 8.41 ‐0.32
Kernel matching 0.64 8.70 ‐8.06 9.46 ‐0.85
FX growth Acquired Not Acquired Difference S.E. T‐stat
Panel B. Controlling for endogenous acquisition - Propensity score matching
In this panel we compare the change in FX lending (2004 minus 2001) by domestic banks which were acquired in 2000, 2001 or 2002 to the
change in FX lending by domestic banks that were not acquired. The propensity to be acquired is estimated as a function of the banks Asset 
volume (log USD, in 2000) and a set of country dummies. The table reports treatment effects based on unmatched comparisons as well as
nearest neigbour matching (with a common support requirement) and kernel matching. ***, ** denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05-level.
Corporates Unmatched 4.96 3.71 1.25 1.51 0.83
Nearest neighbour matching 4.09 2.76 1.33 1.68 0.79
Kernel matching 5.63 3.69 1.95 2.16 0.9
Households Unmatched 9.64 3.29 6.35 2.14 2.96***
Nearest neighbour matching 9.64 3.38 6.26 3.23 1.94**
Kernel matching 9.64 3.39 6.25 3.22 1.94**
Dependent variable: FX share  
(2004 minus 2001)
Corporates Households
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low FX 2001 in country 14.17*** 9.202* 14.68** 17.96** 12.080 19.37**
[3.633] [5.239] [6.416] [6.989] [9.585] [7.717]
Foreign held 7.086 ‐10.170
[4.449] [11.59]
Foreign held*Low FX 2001 7 679 21 240
Table 7.  Convergence of FX lending
In Panel A Low FX 2001 in country is a dummy variable which is 1 if the bank had a lower fraction of FX loans to corporates (households) in 2001 than the country mean. In
Panel B we analyze data for banks that are subsidiaries of a multinational bank. Low FX 2001 in network is a dummy variable which is 1 if the bank had a lower fraction of FX
loans to corporates (households) in 2001 compared to the mean of all subsidiaries of the network it belongs to. All models report OLS estimates. Standard errors are reported in
brackets and are adjusted for clustering by country.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Table 2 provides the definitions and sources of all variables.
Panel B. Within network convergence
Corporates Households
Panel A. Within country convergence
      . .
[6.922] [18.09]
Foreign acquired ‐8.720 12.030
[6.943] [13.02]
Foreign acquired*Low FX 2001 6.375 ‐17.670
[8.737] [15.21]
Low FX 2001  in network 26.29* 25.790
[12.43] [15.00]
Bank‐level changes 2004‐01:
Assets ‐0.121 ‐0.486 ‐0.398 4.115 1.467 ‐1.828 1.412 10.990
[1.990] [2.762] [2.626] [8.395] [9.780] [6.748] [12.39] [6.908]
Wholesale funding 0.125 0.017 0.126 0.212 0.370 0.167 0.630 0.427
[0.101] [0.0787] [0.126] [0.205] [0.234] [0.239] [0.450] [0.644]
FX deposits ‐0.104 ‐0.102 ‐0.076 0.343 0.448 0.080 ‐0.167 0.719***
[0.133] [0.148] [0.216] [0.202] [0.265] [0.147] [0.207] [0.154]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.39 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.54 0.59 0.70 0.85
# Banks 130 106 89 123 99 87 39 37
# countries 20 20 18 20 20 18 17 17
Year 2001 2007 2010
Source BEPS BEPS IMF IMF IMF
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4)
Albania 0.83 0.80 0.70 0.71 0.68
Belarus 0.52 0.71 0.58 0.64 0.80
Bosnia and Herzegovina n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.74 0.72
Bulgaria 0.25 0.37 0.48 0.50 0.61
Croatia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.60 0.73
Estonia 0.37 0.56 0.73 0.78 0.90
FYR Macedonia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.55 0.58
Table A1. Aggregate FX lending in Emerging Europe: 2001-10
This table provides aggregated country-level data on FX lending for the years 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010. Data
source: BEPS, IMF Article IV reports and CEIC. Data for a number of Balkan countries are not comparable across
BEPS and IMF statistics due to a different treatment of FX-linked loans and therefore not shown. The Slovak  Republic 
joined the eurozone in 2009. n.a.: not available. 
2004
Hungary 0.20 0.22 0.32 0.53 0.63
Kazakhstan 0.62 0.51 0.52 0.43 0.42
Latvia 0.62 0.66 0.60 0.86 0.92
Lithuania 0.51 0.47 0.58 0.55 0.75
Moldova 0.28 0.24 0.40 0.44 0.42
Poland 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.33
Romania 0.55 0.69 0.60 0.54 0.63
Russia 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.23 0.22
Serbia 0.35 0.48 n.a. 0.78 0.80
Slovak Republic 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.16 n.a.
Ukraine 0.55 0.59 n.a. 0.50 0.47
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
[1] FX share corporates 1.00
[2] FX share households 0.60 1.00
[3] Assets 0.03 0.01 1.00
[4] Wholesale funding 0.16 0.13 0.05 1.00
[5] FX deposits 0.44 0.43 ‐0.14 ‐0.11 1.00
[6] Internal ratings ‐0.08 ‐0.02 0.05 0.24 ‐0.10 1.00
[7] Corporate deposits 0.10 0.25 ‐0.17 0.06 0.29 ‐0.09 1.00
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
[1] FX share corporates 1.00
[2] FX share households 0.27 1.00
[3] FX growth corporates 0.22 0.30 1.00
[4] FX growth households 0.00 0.58 0.29 1.00
[5] Assets ‐0.02 0.11 0.32 0.50 1.00
[6] Wholesale funding 0.07 0.06 0.14 ‐0.07 0.20 1.00
[7] FX deposits 0.09 0.26 0.03 0.10 ‐0.03 ‐0.04 1.00
Table A2.  Pairwise correlations
Panel B. Bank-level variables: 2004-2001 differences
Panel A. Bank-level variables: 2004
This table provides pairwise correlations for the 2004 values and 2004-01 differences of our bank-
level and country-level variables. Table 2 provides variable definitions and sources.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] Interest  rate differential 1.00
[2] Exrate volatility 0.70 1.00
[3] Interest advantage 0.74 0.20 1.00
[4] Inflation history 0.63 0.63 0.22 1.00
[5] EU accession  ‐0.36 ‐0.27 ‐0.40 ‐0.44 1.00
Panel C. Country-level variables: 2001-04 averages
2nd stage dependent variable FX share corporates FX share households
1st stage dependent variable
Wholesale 
funding
FX deposits
Wholesale 
funding
FX deposits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign greenfield 5.955 0.227 14.31*** 2.750 15.50*** 3.659
[8.915] [10.23] [4.359] [4.942] [4.456] [4.922]
Foreign takeover 12 93* 1 605 ‐1 028 ‐2 405 0 765 ‐3 095
This table provides diagnostic tests related to the instrumentation strategy in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) illustrate the absence of a statistically significant direct
impact of the instruments Corporate deposits and Internal ratings on the share of FX lending. Columns (3) to (6) show the strong correlation between these two
instruments and the endogenous variables Wholesale funding  and FX deposits , respectively, in the first-stage regressions.
Table A3. Diagnostics of IV estimates in models 2 and 7 in Table 4
Validity of Instruments
FX share corporates FX share households
Strength of Instruments
  . . . . . .
[6.784] [7.529] [3.566] [4.320] [3.604] [4.239]
Assets 0.763 2.383 0.288 ‐1.531 0.149 ‐1.519
[1.678] [2.526] [0.933] [1.141] [0.896] [1.115]
Wholesale funding 0.316** 0.372**
[0.135] [0.173]
FX deposits 0.590*** 0.694***
[0.0843] [0.0843]
Corporate deposits 0.0034 0.15 0.039 0.220** 0.050 0.235**
[0.117] [0.115] [0.0744] [0.0945] [0.0783] [0.0968]
Internal ratings ‐8.567* ‐1.925 11.26*** ‐2.350 10.82*** ‐3.326
[4.885] [4.964] [3.346] [4.826] [3.354] [4.798]
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Country fixed effects no no no no no no
R2 0.29 0.25 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.11
# Banks 155 151 155 155 151 151
F test of Internal ratings =0 and 
Corporate deposits =0 (p‐value) 0.20 0.43 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05
Kleibergen‐Paap rk test (p‐value) 0.010.04
